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The Unconstitutional Stub of Section 1441(c)
DOUGLAS D. MCFARLAND*
In its never-ending quest for truth, justice, the American way, and the
reduction of the federal court caseload, Congress just keeps awhittlin' and
awhittlin' at diversity jurisdiction.' The knife cut deeply into separate claim
removal jurisdiction in 1990. While a 'much-reduced federal question stub
remains, no grain of constitutionality can be found in it.
I. AN EXCEPTIONALLY BRIEF HISTORY
Separate claim removal jurisdiction, found in the United States Code, Title
28, section 1441(c), has a venerable history. Removal of separable
controversies entered the panoply of federal court jurisdiction in 1866, allowing
a diverse defendant to remove the separable portion of the case that pertained to
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I Authority for the federal courts to hear diversity cases was granted in Article III of
the United States Constitution, which states, "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies... between Citizens of different States . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. LII, § 2.
Congress acted immediately in the Judiciary Act of 1789 to implement this authority and
grant the federal courts diversity jurisdiction, "IT]he circuit courts shall have original
cognizance . . . where . . . the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is
brought, and a citizen of another State." Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789).
Today, the grant is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
With the burgeoning of the federal caseload, opponents of diversity jurisdiction have,
over the past half century, periodically argued that Congress should abolish it. A brief
survey of views pro and con can be found in Douglas D. McFarland, Diversity Jurisdiction:
Is Local Prejudice Feared?, LrrG., Fall 1980, at 38. So far, Congress has either rebuffed
each attack outright or compromised by one of two methods. Sometimes, Congress
increases the jurisdictional amount. The original amount of $500 set by the Judiciary Act of
1789 was increased in 1887 to $2000, in 1911 to $3000, in 1958 to $10,000, and in 1988 to
$50,000. Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title II, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 4646 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)). Other times, Congress whittles an additional jurisdictional sliver
from the diversity block. For example, since 1948 improper or collusive joinder to create
diversity has been prohibited (28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1988)), since 1958 corporations have had
dual citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988)), and since 1988 the legal representative of
the estate of a decedent has been deemed to be from the same state as the decedent (28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (1988)).
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him.2 Congress over the years amended the statute several times, and separate
claim removal emerged in much its present form in the Judicial Code of 1948. 3
That statute allowed removal of the entire case in the following terms:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be
removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the
district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters not otherwise within its original jurisdiction. 4
Governing separate claim removal jurisdiction for forty-two years, the language
had three noteworthy features: (1) the statute covered both federal question and
diversity jurisdiction cases, (2) the statute required a separate and independent
"claim or cause of action," and (3) the statute removed the "entire case."5
Congress revisited section 1441(c) in 1990 as part of its implementation of
the recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee. 6 While the
2 Removal jurisdiction had existed since the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1
Stat. 73, 79-80, but only for entire cases presenting complete diversity. Of course, clever
plaintiffs named additional local defendants in order to prevent removal. This problem
seemed especially acute following the Civil War, so Congress attempted to protect
nonresident defendants by allowing removal of the separable portion of the case relating to
them:
[If the suit is one in which there can be a final determination of the controversy,
so far as it concerns him, without the presence of the other defendants as parties in the
cause, then and in every such case the alien defendant, or the defendant who is a citizen
of a state other than that in which the suit is brought, may, at any time before the trial or
final hearing of the cause, file a petition for the removal of the cause as against him into
the next circuit court of the United States ....
Act of July 27, 1866, ch. 288, 14 Stat. 306, 306-07 (1868) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 71
(amended 1948)).
3 The history of the statute is traced in several sources. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441
reviser's note (Supp. V 1946); 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3724 (2d ed. 1985); William Cohen, Problents in the Removal
of a "Separate and Independent Claim or Cause of Action," 46 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2-6
(1961); Bradford G. Swing, Federal Connon Law Power to Retand a Properly Removed
Case, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 583 (1987); Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Removal
Jurisdiction Over Separable Controversies Involving Citizens of the Same State, 94 U. PA.
L. REv. 239 (1946).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp. V 1946) (amended 1990).
5 Id.
6 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. The
Federal Courts Study Committee had been created in 1988 to study the federal caseload and
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Committee had recommended repeal of the section, 7 in part because of its
general recommendation for the repeal of diversity jurisdiction, 8 Congress
chose instead to whittle. It cut away diversity cases, leaving separate claim
removal jurisdiction to operate only on federal question cases:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title, is joined with one or more
otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be
removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates. 9
The amendment makes one change to the 1948 removal language, and one
change only. 10 It eliminates diversity jurisdiction cases from separate claim
removal jurisdiction. No change is made in the requirement of a "separate and
independent claim or cause of action," and no change is made in the provision
for removal of the "entire case."
The remainder-separate claim removal jurisdiction for federal question
cases-is unconstitutional. This conclusion follows from the broad
interpretations courts have properly placed on "claim or cause of action" and
"case." This Article now explores these interpretations in turn.
11. THE EXTENT OF A "CLAIM OR CAUSE OF ACTION"
The cause of action fathered the claim. Like some fathers in the insect
realm, this procedural father should not have survived the conception. To
understand this, we explore first the limits of the cause of action.
The "cause of action" became a term of art when code pleading swept
aside common law pleading in the states."I The term had been used only
occasionally under the common law, which relied instead on the forms of
action to limit pleading. With the adoption of state codes in the middle to late
make recommendations for legislation. Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 102, 105, 102 Stat. 4644,
4644-45 (1988).
7 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 94-95 (1990). The Committee opined that section 1441(c) diversity cases
produced needless procedural litigation, and accordingly recommended repeal of the entire
section, or retention only if general diversity jurisdiction were eliminated. The symbiosis
between the Committee and Congress is described in John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory
Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: 7he Judicial Inprovements Acts of
1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 735, 736 n.2, 748-49 (1991).
8 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 7, at 34.
9 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added).
10 The language governing remand is also altered, but this Article analyzes only initial
removal.
I ICharles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE LJ. 817, 820 (1924).
1993]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:1059
1800s, plaintiffs had to plead the facts constituting a "cause of action." As is
well known, much procedural litigation resulted over whether the pleader had
stated her cause of action in sufficient ultimate facts, or in insufficient legal
conclusions or evidentiary facts.12
With the codes requiring a cause of action, the courts undertook the task of
delineating one. Countless appellate opinions struggled to find an acceptable
definition. Even the Supreme Court of the United States grappled with the
phrase. 13 None were successful in finding a universal, everyday definition,
although the effort continued into the 1930s.
12 CI-IARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 38 (2d ed. 1947).
13 Two opinions stand out. The Court's most comprehensive attempt to define cause of
action is Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927), a case in which an initial libel
in admiralty was filed in federal court for an injury on board ship. The injured party
prevailed, but for a small amount. Id. at 318. He tried again in state court, and was
removed to federal court. The question was one of res judicata. The Court, through Justice
Sutherland, said,
Upon principle, it is perfectly plain that the respondent suffered but one actionable
wrong and was entitled to but one recovery, whether his injury was due to one or the
other of several distinct acts of alleged negligence or to a combination of some or all of
them. In either view, there would be but a single wrongful invasion of a single primary
right of the plaintiff, namely, the right of bodily safety, whether the acts constituting
such invasion were one or many, simple or complex.
A cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right
which the facts show.
Id. at 321.
Six years later, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, exhibiting his characteristic distaste for
abstract definitions, backed the Court away from a quest for a comprehensive definition of
cause of action:
A "cause of action" may mean one thing for one purpose and something different
for another. It may mean one thing when the question is whether it is good upon
demurrer, and something different when there is a question of the amendment of a
pleading or of the application of the principle of resjudicata. At times and in certain
contexts, it is identified with the infringement of a right or the violation of a duty. At
other times and in other contexts, it is a concept of the law of remedies, the identity of
the cause being then dependent on that of the form of action or the writ. Another aspect
reveals it as something separate from writs and remedies, the group of operative facts
out of which a grievance has developed. This court has not committed itself to the view
that the phrase is susceptible of any single definition that will be independent of the
context or of the relation to be governed.
United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1933) (footnotes and
citations omitted).
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Two major schools of thought on the "cause of action" emerged. Each
had as its champion a respected law professor: Charles Clark of Yale and O.L.
McCaskill of Cornell. These two combatants, together with a few squires,
carried on a running battle through the law reviews for more than a decade. 14
The contours of the struggle can be seen from a simple tort hypothetical. A
approaches B, (1) strikes B in the face, (2) calls B a horse thief, (3) grabs B's
arm to prevent escape, and (4) takes money from B's wallet to pay for the
horse. B can sue for (1) battery, (2) slander, (3) false imprisonment, and (4)
conversion. Does B have one cause of action, or four causes of action?
Before answering the question, we should highlight the common law and
code concept of "right of action." This concept grew out of the corresponding
right-duty relationship between the injured party and the wrongdoer. An injury
resulted in an unstated right of action. In the simple hypothetical, B has been
injured by A in four distinct ways, so B has four rights of action against A. 15
14 A good pairing to give the tenor of the battle is Clark, supra note 11, and O.L.
MeCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J 614 (1925). Another exchange is
Bernard C. Gavit, A "Pragmatic Definition" of the "Cause of Action"?, 82 U. PA. L. REv.
129 (1933); Charles E. Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 354 (1934); Bernard
C. Gavit, The Cause of Action-A Reply, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 695 (1934). Other volleys
include Charles E. Clark, Joinder and Splitting of Causes of Action, 25 MicH. L. REV. 393
(1927); Bernard C. Gavit, Te Code Cause of Action: Joinder and Counterclaims, 30
COLUM. L. REv. 802 (1930); Silas A. Harris, Wutt is a Cause of Action?, 16 CAL. L. REv.
459 (1928); Oliver L. McCaskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. CI. L. Rav. 281
(1937); Carl C. Wheaton, The Code Cause of Action, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1936). Stray
shots continued even after the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938;
these are collected in S. Elizabeth Gibson, Removal of Claims Related to Bankruptcy Cases:
What is a "Claim or Cause of Action"?, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 n. 11 (1986).
15 When one person wrongs another, the wronged person has an inchoate "right of
action" against the wrongdoer, whether that right of action sounds in tort, contract, or any
other area of the law. As Phillips put the matter,
Where there is a legal right, there is a remedy for its infraction to be obtained by
means of an action in a court of justice. Therefore, when a legal right is wrongfully
infringed, there accrues to the injured party a right to obtain the legal remedy, by action
against the wrongdoer. This secondary or remedial right is called a right of action.
GEORGE L. PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING § 186 at 168 (2d ed. 1932). Only when the facts are
formally pleaded does this right of action become a cause of action. Citing Phillips,
McCaskill stated this succinctly, "The unstated facts give a 'right of action,' but the stated
facts give a 'cause of action.'" O.L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J.
614, 617 (1925).
Clark agreed with this view of right of action and carefully distinguished it from cause
of action:
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Because none of these facts has yet been stated in a complaint, B has as yet no
cause(s) of action against A. Only when the facts are pleaded do we need to
speak of cause(s) of action. While remaining inchoate, B has only four rights of
action, that is, four legal theories of recovery against A.
So far, all agree. 16 Now we return to the original, controversial question:
does B have one cause of action, or four causes of action, against A in a
complaint alleging all four theories of recovery?
McCaskill answered that B has four causes of action. Drawing on earlier
writers on code pleading, 17 McCaskill argued that a cause of action was the
Cause of action is often used interchangeably with right of action and we must
expect to find such usage wherever no occasion arises for making a distinction between
them. But careful analysis would draw such a distinction .... A right of action has
been defined as "the right to prosecute an action with effect."... But more generally
it is used as meaning what we often term the "remedial right," that is the particular
right-duty legal relation which is being enforced in the particular legal action under
consideration. Such right-duty relation always exists when the plaintiff in a legal action
is entitled to a favorable judgment. It seems clear that in the pleading sections of the
Code of 1848, at least, the codifiers by cause of action meant something other than this
right.
Clark, supra note 11, at 823-24 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jacobus v. Colgate, Ill N.E.
837, 839 (1916) (Cardozo, J. )).
16 See discussion supra note 15.
17 In his treatise on code pleading, Pomeroy wrote of cause of action as follows:
Every judicial action must therefore involve the following elements: a primary
right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding primary duty devolving upon the
defendant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of such
primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty
resting on the defendant springing from this delict, and finally the remedy or relief
itself. Every action, however complicated or however simple, must contain these
essential elements. Of these elements, the prnary right and dtay and the delict or
wrong combined constitute the cause of action in the legal sense of the term, and as
used in the codes of the several states.
JOHN N. POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES § 347 (4th ed. 1904) (emphasis added).
Phillips defined cause of action in this manner:
The formal statement of operative facts showing such right and such delict shows a
cause for action on the part of the state and in behalf of the complainant, and is called in
legal phraseology, a cause of action.
From the foregoing definitions of right of action and cause of action, it will be seen
that the former is a remedial right belonging to some person, and that the latter is a
formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to such remedial right. The one is
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intersection of a single right and a single wrong, or in other words, a single
theory of recovery. This is his "fairly accurate definition" of the cause of
action: "It is that group of operative facts which, standing alone, would show
a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving cause for the
state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party or parties whose right was
invaded." 18  One can see that McCaskill's "cause of-action" is virtually
coextensive with the "right of action," or if expanded at all, it is limited and
restricted by the legal right enforced. Consequently, McCaskill would have
said that B has four causes of action.
Clark answered that B has one cause of action. The whole point of the
fusion of law and equity in the codes, he said, was to rid pleading of the
artificial distinctions of the forms of action by requiring only a statement of
facts. 19 With the abolition of the forms of action, the codifiers understood some
limitation on the litigation unit was necessary to avoid a confused mess. The
unit they selected was the cause of action: "The essential thing is that there be
chosen a factual unit, whose limits are determined by the time and sequence
and unity of the happenings, rather than by some vague guess or prophecy of
potential judicial action." 20 The important measuring stick thus was the
convenient unit of facts, not the theory of recovery. This unit of facts, quite
akin to the "transaction," might have one, or more than one, right-duty
relations, that is, rights of action, embedded in it. Instead of the lawyer's
perspective on pleading McCaskill favored, Clark favored a lay perspective: the
matter of right, and depends upon the substantive law; the other is matter of statement,
and is governed by the law of procedure.
From one right of action--that is, from one primary right and one breach
thereof,-may arise a right to two or more different kinds of relief, obtainable in one
action. In such case there being but one right of action, there should be but one cause
of action stated in a complaint asking for several kinds of relief.
A complaint should state a separate cause of action for each right of action
disclosed by the facts therein stated; and whatever facts would, if stated by themselves,
entitle one to relief by action, constitute a right of action, and should be separately stated
as one cause of action.
GEORGE L. PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING §§ 30, 31, 210, 438 (1896).
18 McCaskill, supra note 15, at 638 (1925). A large part of McCaskill's argument
appears to stem from his fear that joinder of a legal "cause of action" and an equitable
.cause of action" might be deemed to waive a jury trial. Id. at 631-32, 638. Even granting
that this argument ever had any validity, it has none today following the decisions in Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), and its progeny. See CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (4th ed. 1983).
19 Clark, supra note 11, at 825.
2 0 CLARK, supra note 12, at 143.
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"cause of action" was "such a group of facts limited as a lay onlooker
would to a single occurrence or affair, without particular reference to the
resulting legal right or rights." 21 The lay perspective would group facts, not
legal theories. The limit of the "cause of action" would therefore be a lay,
pragmatic limit on what facts logically group together:
The cause of action under the code should be viewed as an aggregate of
operative facts which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between
two or more persons. The size of such aggregate should be worked out in each
case pragmatically with an idea of securing convenient and efficient dispatch of
trial business. 2 2
Applying this to our hypothetical plaintiff B, we see that while four theories of
recovery, that is, four rights of action exist, all of this happened at one time
and any nonlawyer would describe this as a single event. Clark would have
maintained that B has one cause of action.
We should be aware of this ancient contest, but need not choose sides, for
the contest was won in 1938 with the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Perhaps the winner was really chosen a few years earlier, in
1934, with the appointment of the advisory committee to draft the rules. Who
should be chosen as reporter to the committee but Professor Charles Clark?
What an opportunity to close the contest! And seize the opportunity he did.
Under the leadership of Clark, the committee banished the term "cause of
action" forever from the lexicon of pleading in the federal courts. The new
term would be "claim for relief," or just "claim."2 Quite clearly, the "claim"
tracks closely Clark's definition of "cause of action:"
The variable character of 'cause of action' has been pointed out .... Because
of its illusive character, that concept has been entirely omitted from the new
rules; but a similar idea is conveyed .... These rules make the extent of the
claim involved depend not upon legal rights, but upon the facts, that is, upon a
lay view of the past events which have given rise to the litigation. Such lay
view of a transaction or occurrence, the subject matter of a claim, is not a
precise concept; its outer limits should depend to a considerable extent upon
the purpose for which the concept is being immediately used. 24
21 Id. at 130.
22 Clark, supra note 11, at 837.
23 FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (stating, "A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief...
shall contain... (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief .... ").
24 CHARLES E. CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 658-59 (1940) (footnotes
and citations omitted).
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The claim is bounded by a lay sense of what events should logically be grouped
together; it in no way is defined by legal rights of action. "There is no question
but what in the Rules 'claim' was used to prevent 'cause of action' from being
construed as McCaskill says the weight of authority construes it." 25
So, in the federal courts and in the rules states that followed the federal
lead, Clark had won. The claim was born and prospers today. The cause of
action joined the ashheap of history.
Unfortunately, many judges just plain did not get it. Trained in the earlier
system, they continued to use the obsolete phrase.26 Perhaps the finest, or one
should say the basest, example is the famous pleading case Dioguardi v.
Durning,27 decided six years after adoption of the Federal Rules. The pro se
plaintiff's nearly unintelligible complaint was dismissed by the district judge
under Rule 12(b)(6) "on the ground that it 'fails to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.'" 28 The appeal went to the Second Circuit.
Whether by serendipity or by another creative appointment, the case ended in
the hands of a panel including Judge Charles Clark, who had doffed his
academic mortarboard in favor of judicial robes. One can only imagine that
upon seeing the file, Clark must have thought to himself, "If I could only die,
then I would be able to spin in my grave." Resisting any impulse to harangue
the district judge, Clark wrote a straight-forward opinion that the Federal Rules
mean what they say. He patiently pointed out that the new rules make no
requirement of pleading a cause of action, but require only "'a short and plain
statement of the claim." 29
Maybe Clark should have loudly vented his frustration, because other
judges and commentators over the years have kept repeating the incantation
"cause of action," 30 and even today some courts still do not get it.3 1
25Arthur 1. Keeffe et al., Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial
Code, 38 VA. L. REv. 569, 610 (1952).
26 This is hardly unexpected. Each new procedural system seems to be greeted with
studied ignorance by lawyers and judges trained over a lifetime in the old ways. The
predecessor of the rules had been received similarly. As one court stated, "The cold, not to
say inhuman, treatment which the infant Code received from the New York judges is a
matter of history." McArthur v. Moffett, 128 N.W. 445, 446 (Wis. 1910), quoted in Clark,
supra note 11, at 830.
27 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
28 Id. at 774.
29 Id. at 775 (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 8(a)).
30 Perhaps the most egregious example is found in a federal practice treatise: "While
Rule 8(a) uses the term 'a claim for relief,' plaintiff must plead a legal right and its
violation, which is what has always been denominated as a 'cause of action.'" 4 C.
THOMPSON, CYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.157 (rev. vol. 1992). See also
discussion infra note 61.
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One court got it, and got it clearly. Some of the most famous decisions of
the United States Supreme Court in the field of civil procedure clearly adopt
the Clark theory.32 None does so more explicitly than the only Court case to
date interpreting section 1441(c) itself.
Il. AN ANALYSIS OF FINN
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn33 was decided in 1951, a time when
the Federal Rules and their thinking about procedural issues had not yet
become dominant. Even so, the opinion of the Court, authored by Justice
Stanley Reed for a majority of six, 34 clearly adopts the Clark view of claim.
Plaintiff Finn, a Texas citizen, attempted to purchase fire insurance on his
property through local agent Reiss, also a Texas citizen.35 Finn alleged Reiss
either negligently failed to place the insurance, or placed it with one of two
foreign insurance companies, American Fire and Casualty, a Florida
31 The unsuccessful attempt by the judges of the Ninth Circuit to replace "claim for
relief" with "cause of action" is discussed in Richard L. Marcus, 7he Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the Federal Rules of ivil Procedure, 86 CoLuM. L. REv. 433, 445 (1986).
32 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), is best known for its expansive language
against dismissal for failure to state a claim. The opinion also rejects the need for pleading
specific facts in detail, and points to the official forms as a demonstration of the sketchy
notice pleading that suffices to state a "claim" under the Federal Rules. Conley is an
absolutely clear rejection of the McCaskill cause of action theory. See id. at 47. Recently
the Court reaffirmed its commitment to Conley claim pleading in Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), is best known as a pendent
jurisdiction case. In its adoption of federal jurisdiction over an entire "case," the opinion
adopts the Clark theory of a single "claim" arising out of one transaction. The often quoted
language is this:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.
But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims
are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to
hear the whole.
Id. at 725. This language echoes Clark. For a discussion of Gibbs, see infra text
accompanying notes 72-78.
33 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
34 The three dissenters did not disagree with the Court's analysis of the removal
statute, but rather argued that defendants should be estopped from seeking remand to state
court for a jurisdictional infirmity when they had sought the removal and then lost at trial in
federal court. Id. at 19-21.
35 See id. at 7-8.
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corporation, or Indiana Lumbermens Mutual, an Indiana corporation. 36 When
the property burned, Finn brought suit in Texas state court against (1) Reiss,
(2) American Fire, and (3) Indiana Lumbermens, in the alternative. Because
Finn and Reiss were of common citizenship, the case could not have been
brought originally in federal court. The two insurance companies, of diverse
citizenship from the plaintiff, nevertheless removed the case to federal court
under section 1441(c); 37 they maintained that the theories against them in the
alternative, even though they would result in only one recovery, were separate
claims or causes of action, allowing removal of the entire case.38
The removed case was tried to a jury in the federal district court. American
Fire lost the verdict. At that point, American Fire decided it had removed the
case from state court improperly. It moved to remand. The district court denied
the motion, and the Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that the plaintiff had asserted
three claims or causes of action. 39 The claim or cause of action against each
defendant was separate and independent, so the case had been properly
removed. The Supreme Court reversed, and held that only a single claim was
stated. 40
Justice Reed noted the 1948 revision of separate claim removal, from
"separable controversy" to "separate claim or cause of action," and concluded
that Congressional intent was not only to avoid interpretive difficulties but also
to narrow the availability of removal jurisdiction.4 1 With that mindset, he
proceeded to interpret the statute.
While "cause of action" had supposedly been banished from the lexicon of
federal procedure in 1938,42 Congress inserted it into section 1441(c) in 1948.
Consequently, the Court had to interpret "separate and independent claim or
cause of action." The key question was whether the plaintiff had asserted three
theories against three defendants in one claim or in three claims. Of course the
decision required was a vote on the old debate between Clark and McCaskill.
The Finn opinion has a little for both sides, perhaps because it recognizes the
admonition of Justice Cardozo that "cause of action" is a phrase of many
meanings. 43 In the end, Clark emerged victorious, but the opinion is curious,
probably made so because the statute is even curiouser.
36 Id. at 14--15.
37 Id. at S.
3 8 See id.
39 Id. at 7-8 (citing 181 F.2d 845 (1950) for the Circuit appeal).
40 Id. at 16, 18-19.
41 Id. at 9-10. The conclusion was based on the Reviser's Note to the 1948 Judicial
Code revision, which is quoted infra in the text accompanying note 53. Finn, 341 U.S. at
10 n.2.
42 See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
43 Finn, 341 U.S. at 12 n.9. See also supra note 13.
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The Court discusses the proper interpretation and application of the claim
or cause of action language in section 1441(c) for some five pages. 44 While
apparently believing the terms are synonymous, 45 in those five pages, the
Court uses "cause of action" seventeen times and "claim" four times. 4 6 Score a
point for McCaskill. He appears to score again with the Court's quotation, "'A
cause of action does not consist of facts, but of the unlawful violation of a right
which the facts show. ' ' 47 This McCaskill point is illusory, however, for the
quotation is from a case that actually held the plaintiff had suffered a single
wrong and so had only a single cause of action.48 The Court next adopts this
single wrong criterion and finds only a single incident, that the plaintiff had
suffered only one fire, that he had only one lOSS. 4 9 Consequently, the plaintiff
may have had three theories against three separate defendants, but had stated
only one claim. Eight, nine, ten. Justice Reed counts McCaskill out and raises
Clark's arm, winner by a knockout.
IV. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1441(c), 1948-1990
The opinion in Finn does seem to waver between the two schools of
thought. Perhaps that is because of the implausible drafting job Congress did in
1948 when it created section 1441(c). Congress discarded the old "separable
controversy." 50 Congress could then have made a "separate and independent
claim" removable. That would have been the clean, consistent change. Even a
statute providing for removal of a "separate and independent cause of action"
would have been pure, if purely wrong. Instead, Congress wrote that a
44 Finn, 341 U.S. at 12-16.
45 Id. at 12 n.5 (stating, "We think the 'claim' set out in a petition states the facts upon
which the 'cause of action' rests. For the purpose of removal, the words cover the same
allegations."). The meaning of the second sentence of this footnote is clear: the terms are
synonymous, at least in this context. The meaning of the first sentence is murky. It seems to
imply that the claim is the formal pleading of the inchoate cause of action. If that be the
meaning, the Court is simply incorrect, for the claim would be the formal pleading of the
inchoate "right of action." See supra note 15. Further, that interpretation would imply a
cause of action is something different from a claim, which interpretation is then denied by
the next sentence.
46 Finn, 341 U.S. at 12-16.
4 7 Id. at 13 (quoting Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927)). Cohen
believes this quotation gives McCaskill "a clear endorsement." Cohen, supra note 3, at 16.
As the following text indicates, however, the language may sound like McCaskill, but the
result is pure Clark.
4 8See Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 321 (1927).
49 Finn, 341 U.S. at 14.
50 See supra note 2 for the superseded statutory language.
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"separate and independent claim or cause of action" is removable. What is that
supposed to mean? At least five possibilities come to mind.
First, the terms were intended to be synonymous, creating a harmless
redundancy. 5' This theory does not explain why Congress would intentionally
draft a redundant statute. It also does not give weight to the usual rule of
statutory construction that every word should be considered and given
meaning. Nevertheless, this is the interpretation adopted by the Finn Court.52
Second, Congress made a drafting error, either in the original draft or in
the editing of the legislative process. This explanation must be rejected, since
the language was unchanged from the considered proposal of the Revision
Committee, and the Reviser's Note gives no clue of a reason for the use of both
terms.
Third, the addition of cause of action to claim may have been a recognition
by Congress that many jurisdictions were in 1948-and many remain today-
code states. The statute in question does, after all, govern removal from all
state courts to federal courts. Under this explanation, claim would refer to
removal from a rules state and cause of action would refer to removal from a
code state. Again, the Reviser's Note gives no hint that this was the purpose.
Fourth, use of both terms may have been an attempt to broaden removal
jurisdiction, the intent being that claim would be a broad, multi-theory term,
and cause of action a narrow, theory-specific term. This interpretation would
give meaning to both terms in the statute. It would also mean that Finn was
wrongly decided. This theory must be rejected out of hand, however, since the
Reviser's Note states the amended statute "will somewhat decrease the volume
of Federal litigation." 53 Granted, this language does not specifically say that
the intent of the amendment was to reduce the number of cases removed-
although Finn so interpreted it-but a statement that the volume of removal
cases will be decreased certainly cannot be twisted into a positive intent to
increase the possibilities for removal.
Finally, the theory most likely is a combination of inadvertence and
stealthy intent. The Revision Committee that drafted the statute was composed
of men with national reputations in the field of federal civil procedure.5 4 The
5 1 James W. Moore & William VanDerreek, Multi-Party, Multi-Claim Removal
Problems: The Separate and Independent Claim Under Section 1441(c), 46 IowA L. REv.
489, 499 n.44 (1961). Of course, the first author of this article was the primary reviser for
section 1441(c), so the argument that he intentionally drafted a redundancy comes with ill
grace.
52 Finn, 341 U.S. at 12 n.5.
53 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) reviser's note.
54 be members of the Revision Committee for the Judicial Code of 1948 were
William W. Barron, West Publishing, Chief Reviser; Walter Armstrong, former ABA
President; Professor John Dickinson, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; Judge
Clarence G. Galston, Eastern District of New York; Alexander Holtzoff; Judge Albert B.
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revisers earned these national reputations over years; certainly they all had been
trained in the law before 1938. Accordingly, every one of them was trained in,
and worked with, the "cause of action" for years. One can only suppose that
some or even all of them did not "get it," even ten years after the fact.55 This
does not mean that they all were unreconstructed McCaskillists. Perhaps they
were covering their bets by drafting in both terms; the statute does indeed seem
impossibly to embrace both McCaskill and Clark. This may have been quite
intentional. Probably a larger portion is simply, wrong headedly sticking to the
old ways. The committee certainly had no idea it was doing anything
controversial with the language. 56 Not one member of the Revision Committee,
not one member of Congress, ever wrote, in legislative history, or in legal
article, that he or she was attempting to bring McCaskill's theory of cause of
action back into federal practice.
Mars, Third Circuit; Justin Miller; Professor James W. Moore, Yale Law School; Judge
John J. Parker, Fourth Circuit; Judge John B. Sanborn, Eighth Circuit; Judge William F.
Smith, District of New Jersey; and Floyd E. Thompson. They were assisted by the editorial
staffs of West Publishing Co. and Edward Thompson Co. JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S
COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CODE 64, nn.4-7 (1949).
55 See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
56 In general, the committee members told Congress that they had made no substantive
changes. Congressman Keogh told his colleagues, "[W]e proceeded upon the hypothesis
that since that was primarily a restatement of existing law, we should not endanger its
accomplishment by the inclusion of the work of any highly controversial changes in law."
Hearings before Subcomnm No. 1 of the House Jud. Conm on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947). His assertion was based on the statement of Judge Albert
Maris, "[Clare has been taken to make no changes in the existing laws which would not
meet with substantially unanimous approval." Id. at 19. See also Keeffe et al., supra note
25, at 571 n.4.
The only word of the Reviser's Note on this statute is the following:
Subsection (c) permits the removal of a separate cause of action but not of a
separable controversy unless it constitutes a separate and independent claim or cause of
action within the original jurisdiction of United States District Courts. In this respect, it
will somewhat decrease the volume of Federal litigation.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) reviser's note. Most noteworthy are the first two lines: the committee
contrasts the old "controversy" with the new "cause of action," not the new "claim." See
id.
Certainly, the revisers thought they were simplifying the statute to eliminate litigation
over the limits of a "separable controversy." Professor James Moore said as much to
Congress: "I believe considerable improvement has been made by Section 1441(c) relative
to the removal of separable controversies and separate units-a matter which is in great
confusion at the present time." Hearings before SubcomL No. I of the House Jud. Comm.
on H.R. 1600 and H.R. 2055, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1947).
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Yet exactly that would have happened, at least in removal jurisdiction, but
for Finn. Finn flatly rejected a separate, theory-specific, party-specific meaning
for the statute. Officially, McCaskill's theory was reinterred.
Not everyone has cheered Finn. Some writers, self-confessed "students of
the McCaskill theory or pleading," 57 commented caustically that Justice Reed 58
"has swallowed the Yale Law School (i.e., Clark) party line as to 'cause of
action' and the Harvard Law School (i.e., Frankfurter) party line as to the
viciousness of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 59
Well, so what! I demur. Whoops, walt a second, a slip on the keyboard
there; I just used an obsolete term. "Demurrer" is an obsolete, dead term in
federal civil procedure. 60 Well, so is "cause of action," yet it stalks the legal
landscape like Frankenstein's monster, horrifying the good citizens who
thought they had buried the body parts over half a century ago. Maybe Clark
should have written the demise into a specific rule, as he did for "demurrer."
"Cause of action" is just as cold and stiff as "demurrer," but it does not have
the same decency to go away and lie down. 61
57 Keeffe et al., supra note 25, at 607.
58 Perhaps by referring only to the author of the opinion, the commentators seek to
denigrate it, but in fact they are referring to the opinion of the Court, concurred in by six
Justices.
59 Keeffe et al., supra note 25, at 605.
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 7(c) (stating, "Demurrers... shall not be used.").
61 Amble into almost any law school class across the country. The professor will likely
say, "Does the plaintiff have a cause of action for this injury?" or "Do these facts give rise
to a cause of action?" This language comes from the same people who would not be caught
dead using "demurrer," or saying anything, for that matter, without absolute precision.
To repeat, in the first place, the historically correct term is "right of action." Second,
the "cause of action," at least for Clarkists, and after all, Clark is embodied in the Federal
Rules, never meant any narrow, single theory of recovery. Third, "claim" has entirely
supplanted "cause of action" for all purposes in the federal courts and rules states.
At least, the query should be, "Does plaintiff have a claim for this injury," even though
that itself would be a slight misstatement, since claim refers to the pleaded transaction. If
"does plaintiff have a legally cognizable injury" is cumbersome, then "does plaintiff have a
fight of action" would at least have the blessing of history.
Unfortunately, these professors are merely passing along to their students the
misstatement foisted on them by their own professors. Our most distinguished authorities yet
today sometimes write "cause of action" when they mean "claim." Only within this narrow
area of separate claim removal jurisdiction, a few examples suffice. E.g., IA JAMES W.
MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 0.16211] (2d ed. 1993) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter MooRE's FEDERAL PRACricE]:
In other words a fragment of a cause of action can no longer furnish a basis for
removal; one of two or more causes of action may do so. To prevent the old separable
controversy wine from being served under the new label, courts have properly given a
broad meaning to "cause of action." Thus where a group of operative facts gives rise to
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a claim on the part of the plaintiff, as where several persons contribute to his injury and
he sues one or more of them in one action, the plaintiff is proceeding on one cause of
action, and it is not removable under § 1441(c).
Id.
At least the authors used "claim" oned! The reader might also note that Professor
Moore, the primary author, is also the man responsible for foisting the disjunctive language
of section 1441(c) on unsuspecting lawyers, judges, and litigants. The other leading treatise
on federal civil procedure perpetuates the same mistake, although notably to a much less
egregious degree. WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 3, § 3724, at 368, 384 ("The Finn case held
that there is but a single cause of action . . . . There are a few additional rules limiting the
notion of what constitutes a separate and independent cause of action."). Even the
commentator chosen to explain the 1990 statutory amendment is not blameless. While
properly using "claim" throughout, he does slip once, "There was but a single cause of
action here [in Finn]." David D. Siegel, Conmnentary on 1990 Revision, in 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(c) (West Supp. 1993). Of course, as mentioned previously, even the Reviser's Note
to the 1948 amendment used this language. See supra note 56.
Perhaps a person should not be so dogmatic about this difference, which could be
viewed as a semantic quibble. Many today consider the terms "claim" and "cause of
action" to be interchangeable. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.4,
at 619 n.1 (1985); 1B JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE i 0.410[1],
n.2 (2d ed. 1993); Gibson, supra note 14, at 47 n.199. Maybe "cause of action" has
acquired a prescriptive right to exist. Yes, both the common law and the English language
are constantly growing. Maybe cause of action today means something quite different from
what it did in 1938. But we are dealing here with a legal term, a legal term of art, finely
honed after a protracted battle over its meaning. This is not a mere semantic difference. The
meaning should be changed only by intention, not by benign neglect, even over a period of
years.
After all, the only serious frontal attack by the McCaskillites since 1938 was defeated
soundly. In the early 1950s, the Ninth Circuit proposed that FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2) be
amended to require pleading of "facts necessary to state a cause of action." See Marcus,
supra note 31, at 445. The proposal was summarily rejected by the Advisory Committee.
See id. (citing REPORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18-19 (1955)). Of course, at that time, Clark was
still around to fend off attacks on the claim, such as the attempt by some judges in the
Southern District of New York to require more specific pleadings in large cases. S~e
Charles E. Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45, 49 (1957). Since
Clark's passing, the special pleading advocates have made some progress, although the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (1982) certainly views claim through
Clark's vision. The Supreme Court once again has reaffirmed Clark's rejection of special
pleading requirements in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
[Vol. 54:10591074
SECTION 1441(c)
Others have complained that Finn's interpretation of section 1441(c) means
that few cases will be removed successfully under it.62 Again, so what! That
was the policy choice of Congress, enforced by the Court.
Some critics have attempted to limit Finn strictly to its facts, a case
involving one plaintiff suing multiple defendants in the alternative for a single
recovery. 63 These critics are largely of two types: McCaskillites fighting a rear
guard retreat who do not realize their base camp has been captured, 64 or fans of
federal courts expanding their jurisdiction to the extent possible, oblivious to
the proposition that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. 65 This
Article will not address these multiple party questions, or other related
questions, 66 but suffice it to say that the Finn tent is broad enough to
encompass many multi-party litigations. 67 Despite the criticism of Finn by
62 E.g., Duke Duvall, Removal-The "Separate and Independent Caim," 7 OKLA. L.
REV. 385 (1954); Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 51, at 497; Note, Renval Under
Section 1441(c) of the Judicial Code, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 101, 106-07 (1952) [hereinafter
Renoval Under Section 1441 (c)].
63 For example, Cohen states,
In fact, the opinion in Finn contains enough "all-things-to-all-men" language in
defining a cause of action to create debate, at least, in the following types of multiple-
party cases: multiple-defendant cases where payment of a judgment against one
defendant need not be credited in full to other defendants; multiple-defendant cases
where plaintiff is seeking relief other than money damages; multiple-plaintiff cases; and
cases where controversies are introduced by counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party
claim, intervention or garnishment.
Cohen, supra note 3, at 14-16 (footnotes omitted).
64 Id.; e.g., Keeffe et al., supra note 25, at 607.
65 E.g., Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 51, at 496 ("A broad and liberal
construction of Article III of the Constitution in favor of federal judicial power is proper; its
language has a living flexibility.").
66 Also beyond the scope of this Article is discussion of the possible shifting meaning
of "claim" in other contexts, such as appealability of multiple claims under FED. R. CIv. P.
54(b) or res judicata. See Gibson, supra, note 14, at 43, 59.
67 A single claim can include multiple plaintiffs. CLARK, supra note 12, at 139-40;
WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 3, § 3724 at 386-88; Removal Under Section 1441(c), supra
note 56, at 106-07; see also cases collected in 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441, at 522-24 (Law. Co-op.
1988). A single claim can include multiple defendants. MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 61, 0.16314.-5], at 331-35; Clark, supra note 11, at 834-36; see also cases collected
in 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441, at 524-25 (Law. Co-op. 1988).
The removability of counterclaims, cross-claims, and third-party claims under section
1441(c) has not yet clarified. One would suppose that only compulsory counterclaims
present any compelling reason to fight over removability, because they must be brought. All
of these other joinder devices are permissive, so if the party holding a third-party claim, for
example, wants to bring it in federal court, the party need only assert it in an independent
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some commentators, both the letter and the spirit of the opinion have been
relatively well applied by the lower federal courts. 68
Such is the history of the statute to 1990. Even though the statute
encompassed both federal question and diversity cases, it had originally been
designed in 1948 primarily for diversity cases. 69 Of course, the great bulk of
the decisions from 1948 to 1990 involved diversity cases. Then in 1990,
Congress whittled a great chip-the diversity cases chip-from section 1441(c),
leaving the statute to operate only on federal question cases. We proceed to
examine what really remains.
V. THE EXTENT OF A FEDERAL "CASE"
Once a separate and independent claim provides a federal jurisdictional
basis for removal, the statute allows removal of the "entire case." This means
whatever other portions of the litigation are comprised in the same
constitutional "case" can ride into federal court as part of-not with-the
jurisdictionally sufficient claim.
The concept of the constitutional "case" requires us to make a brief
exploration of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. Years ago, the federal
courts developed pendent jurisdiction,70 which allowed a state law theory to
ride into federal court on the strength of a federal law theory so long as both
were encompassed within the same cause of action. This necessarily required
interpretation of "cause of action," and in Hum v. Oursler,71 the Supreme
Court a generation earlier than Finn defined cause of action broadly, along the
lines urged by Clark.
action. Generally, section 1441(c) has not been applied to allow removal of these other
joined claims as separate and independent, although the reason given has varied. See
WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 3 at 388-91; Note, 77rd-Party Removal under Section
1441(c), 52 FORDHAM L. Rav. 133 (1983). Some commentators narrowly conclude that the
section applies only to claims of the plaintiff. See MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
61, 0.163[4.-6] at 352. A recent trend has developed in federal courts, however, to hold
that such facts constitute a single transaction or interlocked series of transactions, in clear
pursuit of the ClarklFinn rationale. See cases collected in 28 U.S.C.S. § 1441, at 88 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990).
68 The cases are collected in Cohen, supra note 3, at 13 n.54; Moore & VanDercreek,
supra note 51, at 502 n.65; and Note, Cvil Procedure-Boggs v. Lewis: Removal of
Insurance Bad Faith laims Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c): 77Te Legal Independence and
"Same Transaction, Same Relief' Tests, 20MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 253, 258 n.35 (1990).
69 Cohen, supra note 3, at 19.
70 The history is developed in Note, 77Te Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of
Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1018 (1962).
71 289 U.S. 237 (1933). The plaintiffs two theories of patent infringement and unfair
competition were concluded to be "different grounds asserted in support of the same cause
of action." Id. at 247. Quite clearly, this would be Clark's conclusion, not McCaskill's.
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Another generation later, following promulgation of the Federal Rules,
birth of the "claim," and official death of the "cause of action," the Supreme
Court was again called on to interpret the scope of pendent jurisdiction, this
time in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.72 In Gibbs, the plaintiff sued the
defendant labor union on two theories: a federal question theory of labor law
violation, and a state law theory of unfair competition. 73 The facts supporting
both of these theories were inextricably twined. Even under law prior to the
federal rules, the plaintiff would have been pleading two theories of a single
cause of action. Certainly, the same is true under the Federal Rules; plaintiff
had two theories of a single claim.
The Court began by calling its thirty-three year-old Hum test
"unnecessarily grudging," 74 because it was based on the obsolete "cause of
action," even though application of that test would have reached the same result
Gibbs eventually reached. The Court thus once again threw the cause of action
into the trash can, and pointedly referred only to claim. 75 In redefining pendent
jurisdiction to deal with claims rather than causes of action, the Court
concluded pendent jurisdiction exists in the following situation:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal or state character, a
plaintiff's claims are such that he would ordinarily be expected to try them all
in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues,
there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. 76
Clark could hardly have written it better. The common nucleus of operative
fact forms a litigation block that a lay plaintiff would expect to try together.
That, according to Gibbs, is a constitutional "case." That, according to Clark,
is a "claim." 77 Under either approach, that is the limit of federal jurisdiction. 78
Pendent jurisdiction became part of supplemental jurisdiction in 1990. 79
72 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
73 Id. at 715.
74 1d. at 725.
75 See id. Actually, the Court's opinion here is not quite as sure-footed as one could
hope. While the opinion clearly refers only to claim and claims, and clearly embraces
Clark's theory of pleading, it repeats an error. For example, the Court writes,
"[WIhenever there is a claim 'arising under' . . . and the relationship between that claim
and the state claim.. . ." Id. at 725. The error is reference to claims. One claim was
pleaded. The plaintiff had multiple theories of recovery, on one claim.
76 Id. at 725.
77 See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. The choice of the Gibbs Court was to
call a common nucleus of operative fact a case. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. Earlier tests
informed the Gibbs language choice. See Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering One
"Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. Rnv. 1399, 1448-49 (1983). Clark himself had
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VI. BLENDING SECTION 1441 (c) AND SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
As the preceding discussion has shown, Finn interpreted section 1441(c)
broadly and consistently with the Clark theory of claim. So long as the
different theories arose from a single transaction or series of transactions, and a
lay person would expect them to be tried together, one claim would exist.
previously written of the need for an "identity of operative facts" in Lewis v. Vendome
Bags, Inc., 108 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 660 (1940) (Clark, J.,
dissenting). In another opinion, Clark thought that a "fundamental core" of facts formed the
case. Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 64 (1942) (Clark, J. dissenting).
While McCaskill of course denied the existence of a single cause of action, he might
well have agreed with the result in Gibbs, for he defined "transaction" in lay terms much
the same as Clark previously defined cause of action and claim. See McCaskill, supra note
15, at 646-47 ("It is the totality of operative facts which, determined by the principle of
administrative convenience, can be dealt with in one suit."). Justice Reed, the author of
Finn, used similar reasoning in Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp.,
305 U.S. 315, 324-35 (1938); the language was cited for support by Gibbs for the crucial
common nucleus of operative fact language. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 n.13.
78 Gibbs "delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power." Owen Equip.
& Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371 (1978). See generally Matasar, supra note 77
at 1414-1.6; Swing, supra note 3, at 590-92.
At least one commentator has suggested the Gibbs test is alternative in form. That is,
pendent jurisdiction exists either when there is a common nucleus of operative fact or when
the plaintiff would expect to try the matters together. Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand,
and Review in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases, 41 VAND. L. REV. 923, 935 n.72
(1988). This reading of the penultimate paragraph of Gibbs is strained indeed, and its basis
is not detailed by the commentator. Perhaps the interpretation turns on the admittedly
inappropriate use of "but if" in the middle of the paragraph; that language can reasonably
be considered only as a slip of the editing process. If no common nucleus of operative fact
exists between two matters, then no reasonable plaintiff would expect to try them together.
Consequently, the test is unitary.
79 The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
created a new 28 U.S.C. § 1367, supplemental jurisdiction, which encompasses the former
pendent jurisdiction:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (Supp. H 1990).
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Removal could not be accomplished. Only when an entirely unrelated matter
was joined would a separate and independent claim be asserted, allowing
removal under section 1441(c).
This understanding of claim dovetails nicely with the Gibbs interpretation
of claim and constitutional case. The case includes a common nucleus of
operative fact that a lay person would expect to be tried together. When this is
so, pendent jurisdiction, now supplemental jurisdiction, exists over the state
law portion of the same constitutional case.
What this means today in the language of the 1990 removal statute is that
supplemental jurisdiction is essentially coextensive with removal jurisdiction
under the basic removal statute, section 1441(a):
[Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or
the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and
division embracing the place where such action is pending. 80
Consequently, so long as any state law theory is based on the same facts as the
federal law theory, it is part of the same claim and the same constitutional case,
and so is removable under section 1441(a) and supplemental jurisdiction of
section 1367. Section 1441(c) is therefore left to operate solely on a set of
facts, that is, a claim, that is truly separate and independent.
Accordingly, section 1441(a) and section 1441(c) cover the entire field.
Either the state law theory is part of the same claim and so qualifies for
supplemental jurisdiction to the federal law theory, or the state law theory is
separate and independent and so qualifies for removal as a separate and
independent claim.81
Some commentators have argued that these two categories do not cover
the field, that a third category exists in the middle. Stating their argument will
reveal its flaw. They say that section 1441(c) allows removal only of
completely separate and independent claims. So far, so good. They then point
out that supplemental jurisdiction under section 1441(a) reaches only so far as
the limits of the claim. Again, we follow. Then they define claim narrowly.
Whoa! Here's the error. The Clark claim, just as was cause of action, is not a
80 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (Supp. 111990) (in part).
81 Other commentators agree. RIcHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BAsic
COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE at 53 (Supp. 1993); MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
61, 0.163121 (Supp. 1992-93); Charles Rothfeld, Rationalizing Removal, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 221, 237; David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1990 Revision, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441
(West Supp. 1992).
One commentator points out that section 1441(c) can still operate only in the narrow
area in which another federal statute prevents complete removal, such as workers'
compensation cases. Oakley, supra note 7, at 749-50 n.45.
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narrow concept, but instead is exceedingly broad; because the Clark claim is
indisputably written into the Federal Rules, one can hardly see any room for
argument for a narrower definition. But let them finish for a moment. Because
claim is narrow and supplemental jurisdiction covers only the limits of the
claim, and section 1441(c) covers only an entirely separate claim, there must be
some cases in the middle, with sufficient factual relatedness to be part of the
claim, but not in the common nucleus of operative fact. 82 Post-Gibbs, this
simply cannot be. 83 Perhaps these suggestions should be tastefully ignored,
since they were made pre-Gibbs, before the Court made clear that the federal
claim/case is much broader than the commentators had thought. Because this
argument is based on a discarded vision of claim-in fact, the vision was of
cause of action-it need detain us no longer. 84
VII. THE REMAINING, UNCONSTITUTIONAL STUB
Prior to the massive revision by the Judicial Code of 1948, section 1441(c)
applied only to diversity cases. 85 No serious constitutional challenge to it was
entertained by the courts, although commentators discussed the subject. 86 In
1948, Congress added federal question separate claim removal. The addition
was unusual, because the Revision Committee and Congress believed they were
restricting separate claim removal. 87 This suggests Congress at that time did
not even consider the applicability of section 1441(c) to federal question cases.
Nevertheless, from 1948 until 1990, the statute continued to operate in
diversity cases. In 1990, Congress whittled away diversity from separate claim
82 John H. Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate
and Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HARV. L. REV. 423, 441 (1953);
Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 51, at 506 n.81.
83 See supra text accompanying notes 72-78.
84 Also to be discounted are more recent comments pointing out that pendent party
jurisdiction may pose problems, because the facts involving the new party may be closely
related (not separate and independent) yet parties are not covered by pendent jurisdiction.
WRIGHtT, ET AL., supra note 3, § 3724 at 400-02; Rothfeld, supra note 81, at 237-38. Since
the 1990 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. Il 1990) now allows pendent parties to be
included in the same constitutional case, this problem disappears.
85 28 U.S.C. § 71 (1940) permitted removal of a separable controversy, "which is
wholly between citizens of different states." See supra note 2.
86 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 22, 34; Edwin R. Holmes, The Separable
Controversy-A Federal Removal Concept, 12 Miss. L.J. 163, 170-71 (1939); Arthur J.
Keeffe & Frederick B. Lacey, 7he Separable Controversy-A Federal Concept, 33
CORNELL L.Q. 261, 262-63 (1947); Keeffe et al., supra note 25, at 600-01; Note,
Separation of Causes in Renval Proceedings, 41 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1049 n.13 (1928);
Note, The Constitutionality of Federal Removal Jurisdiction Over Separable Controversies
Involving Otizens ofthe Same State, 94 U. PA. L. REv. 239, 241-45 (1946).
87 See supra note 56.
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removal jurisdiction. Only from that time forward has section 1441(c) been
limited to federal question cases.
So what remains today is this. When the state law theory is factually
related to the federal question theory, it would be part of the same case and
expected to be tried together; consequently, supplemental jurisdiction provides
the authority for the federal court to proceed under section 1441(a). Only when
the state law matter is not factually related does section 1441(c) govern. The
situation would have to be something like the following. Plaintiff sues
defendant for a violation of the civil rights laws, a federal question. In count
two, plaintiff joins a factually related breach of contract theory. Supplemental
jurisdiction under section 1367 brings this theory into federal court. No
argument so far. In count three, plaintiff joins a completely unrelated breach of
contract, a garden variety state law claim. The terms of section 1441(c) sweep
count three into federal court on the jurisdictional strength of count one. Is such
a result constitutional?
We can find initial guidance in earlier commentaries, although with a
single exception, these earlier analyses predate not only the 1990 revision but
also Gibbs, and so are largely obsolete. Nevertheless, they provide a first
foundation in our consideration.
As a reviser of the Judicial Code of 1948, Professor Moore had the first
opportunity to consider the constitutionality of section 1441(c). He opined that
"Congress could constitutionally make the statutory grant of removal
jurisdiction broader than its statutory grant of original jurisdiction. "88 Because
Moore has restated his position more recently and more fully, analysis of it will
be deferred for now.
The 1948 revision brought a spate of comments on the constitutionality of
section 1441(c), 89 but the next major analysis came five years later from
Professor Lewin. 90 Disagreeing with Moore, he concluded that the section
could operate unconstitutionally. Lewin's conclusion is based primarily on his
reading of Hum v. Oursler,91 the leading pendent jurisdiction case prior to
Gibbs. He noted that in Hum, the Court examined a complaint with three
counts: copyright infringement of a play, unfair competition for the same
version of the play, and unfair competition for a revised, uncopyrighted version
88 MOORE, supra note 54, at 253.
89 See, e.g., Duvall, supra note 62, at 391; Note, Courts-U.S. Code Judiciary and
Judicial Procedure-Removal of Causes under the Revised Judicial Code, 33 MINN. L.
REV. 738, 742 n.19 (1949); Note, Federal Jurisdiction: Removal: Judicial Code Section
1441(c): Removable "Separate and Independent Gaim or Cause of Action," 40 CAL. L.
REV. 317, 320 n.18 (1952); Note, 77e "Separable Controversy" Problem of Federal
Jurisdiction: How Affected By The New Judicial Code?, 10 U. PrTr. L. REv. 385, 389
(1949).
90 Lewin, supra note 82.
91 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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of the play.92 The first count was of course a federal question. The second
count qualified for pendent jurisdiction because it was part of the same cause of
action and inseparable. The constitutional basis for hearing this count depended
on the principle of Osborn v. Bank of the United States,93 which stated that so
long as a federal question forms "an ingredient of the original cause,"
Congress can properly grant the federal courts power to hear the entire
"cause," or case. 94 As to the third count, the Hum Court decided it was a
separate and distinct cause of action, not part of the same case, and so beyond
the jurisdiction of the federal court.95
Lewin accordingly concluded that a theory not coming within the pendent
jurisdiction of the court would not have any basis for federal jurisdiction. 96
Since section 1441(c) provided for the federal court to hear separate and
independent claims or causes of action, it unconstitutionally brought these
claims or causes of action into federal court.
Responding to Lewin, Professors Moore and VanDercreek argued strongly
that section 1441(c) could constitutionally bring an unrelated claim into federal
court. 97 They rejected the idea that Hum involved any constitutional
construction and said it was only a statutory interpretation. 98 "[The fact that
the district court's removal jurisdiction under section 1441(c) is broader than its
original jurisdiction means only that statutory removal is broader than statutory
original jurisdiction." 99 In other words, the authors apparently reasoned that
because Osborn requires only a federal ingredient for federal jurisdiction,
Congress had by statute properly made removal jurisdiction broader than
original jurisdiction. 100
Identifying weaknesses in both the constitutional attack and the defense,
Professor Cohen eventually sided with the defenders of the statute. 10 1 He
argued that section 1441(c) fulfills the legitimate Congressional purpose of
92 Lewin, supra note 82, at 433.
93 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
94 Id. at 824.
95 Hum, 289 U.S. at 245-46. As the reader might suspect from the discussion earlier
in this Article, this author disagrees with the Court's conclusion that count three constituted
a separate cause of action, but that question need not be explored for the purposes of the
present discussion.
96 Lewin, supra note 82, at 433.
97 Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 51.
98 Id. at 498. Cohen also criticized Lewin's "assumption" that Hum delineated the
limits of federal judicial power. Cohen, supra note 3, at 36-37.
99 Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 51, at 496. This language of course echoed
Moore's statement in 1949. See supra note 88.
100 See Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 51, at 498.
101 Cohen, supra note 3.
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"protection of litigants' access to the federal courts." 102 He noted the trend
toward joinder of all matters that can efficiently be tried together, and feared
that parties may not have "a truly free choice between state and federal court,"
so he opined, "[T]he constitutional scope of pendent jurisdiction in federal
question cases should encompass, at a minimum, all claims which can be
expeditiously tried in a single proceeding." 0 3
All of these prior analyses are seriously limited because they predate
Gibbs, and so they have been sketched rather briefly. Only one commentary
post-dates Gibbs. It will be developed and criticized in some detail.
This commentary once again is by Professor Moore, his third defense of
the constitutionality of the statute, each time with more length and vigor, and
each time with a new co-author. 104 His conclusion is the same as sketched
earlier, that so long as a federal question is an ingredient of the case, federal
judicial power exists over the whole case.10 5
Moore's analysis to reach this conclusion is important enough and succinct
enough to reproduce in full:
A broad and liberal construction of Article III of the Constitution, in favor of
federal judicial power is proper; its language has a living flexibility.
A harder case, perhaps, is where there is no diversity to support removal;
claim 1 involves a federal matter warranting removal, but claim 2 involves
only a local, and unrelated matter. While this suit could not be brought
originally in the federal district court under the Gibbs doctrine, the fact that
claim 2 is unrelated to claim 1 does not necessarily put it beyond the pale of
ancillary jurisdiction....
The authority conferred on Congress by the Constitution is not limited to a
legislative course of perfection. It does not seem unwise, to us, that Congress
has provided for a removal of the entire action, with discretion in the district
court to remand claim 2 if it thinks this is proper. But assuming lack of
legislative wisdom, that in itself does not invalidate § 1441(c).
And in State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Tashire the Supreme
Court laid to rest any doubts as to the constitutionality of removal under
Section 1441(c) of an entire case involving multiple plaintiffs or multiple
defendants where complete diversity is lacking, but where diversity exists as to
at least one separate and independent claim. In such cases the claims, if
properly joined, may be totally unrelated. It follows from the Tashire decision
that the constitutional validity of § 1441(c) is not affected where original
102 1d. at 38.
103 Id. at 38, 39.
104 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 61, 0.163[3]. The two previous
versions were MOORE, supra note 54, at 253 and Moore & VanDercreek, supra note 51, at
495-98.
105 See infra text accompanying note 106 and criticism infra text accompanying notes
107-08.
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federal jurisdiction over the separate and independent claim is based on a
federal question rather than diversity. 106
A number of unbridged chasms mar this argument. First, Moore and
Ringle start from a proposition that is not only wrong but also is 180 degrees
from the accepted wisdom. They say that Article MII must be interpreted
broadly, with living flexibility. 107 Without broadening this analysis into a full
blown constitutional law debate, I state only my definite impression that
everyone accepted the fact that the federal government is one of limited
powers, and that the federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only
so much jurisdiction as the Constitution and Congress have given them. Should
that proposition be so, and it does not even seem to need citation support, then
the authors have reached the wrong conclusion because they have started their
search facing in the wrong direction.
Looking beyond this initial error, we find the authors appear to be saying
that so long as the federal question comprises an ingredient of the litigation,
then Osborn grants the federal court jurisdiction over the entire case.108 Let us
grant that is so. It does not help their argument, for the flaw is that section
1441(c) today stretches beyond the "entire case."
The patency of the constitutional rub is apparent in a rather simple
analysis. We start with a nondiversity case with a federal question in it. Such a
case gives the federal court jurisdiction, whether on an original or removal
basis. That federal question allows the federal court to decide other portions of
106 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 61, 0.16313], at 317, 320-21 (footnotes
omitted).
107 1d. at 317. The only support offered for this extraordinary statement is a citation to
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), which offers as much
support as a sinking man will find in quicksand. See discussion of Tashire infra note 108.
108 Rather than citing Osborn, the authors chose to rest on the authority of State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), which of course was an interpleader
case. Clearly they refer to the early portion of the opinion that in less than a page and a half
resolves a debate that simmered for a century and a half. MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 61, 0.163[31, at 321. In Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806), the Court laid down the rule of complete diversity, but the basis as constitutional or
statutory was not clarified. See id. Finally, Tashire said that Strawbridge was statutory
construction only, so that the interpleader statute requiring only minimal diversity was
within the Constitution. Tashire, 386 U.S. at 531.
Be that as it may, one must remember that an interpleader case, by its very nature,
involves a common res, and so a common nucleus of operative fact. No matter how many
claimants are involved, they are all bound up in their interest in the common res, so their
interests are all part of the same constitutional case. Surely, this situation provides no
support for an argument that a matter completely and totally factually unrelated to the
federal ingredient is part of the same constitutional case solely because state joinder law
allows the two matters to be pleaded together.
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the case that would not by themselves properly be in federal court; such is the
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. In fact, the court can decide the entire
case, so long as the federal question forms an ingredient of the case. Thus says
Osborn.
So now we reach the demarking of the outer limits of the constitutional
case. A choice of limits could be suggested. The case may be limited to matters
included in the same claim, defined in the broad Clark sense. The case might
be limited to the same transaction or series of transactions. The case may be
limited to the common nucleus of operative fact, and encompass all matters that
a lay person would ordinarily expect to be tried together. Thus says Gibbs, and
Gibbs has been interpreted as defining the outer limits of a constitutional
case. 109
Probably we should adopt the Gibbs formulation, but no matter which of
the above we choose, the exercise of federal jurisdiction over the portion of the
litigation beyond the constitutional case remains unconstitutional, even beyond
the broad reach of Osborn. And that is exactly what, and only what, section
1441(c) encompasses.
Let us return to our earlier example. The litigation is brought in state court
absent diversity for count one, a violation of the civil rights laws in terminating
an employee; count two, a common law breach of the employment contract;
and count three, a breach of contract in an entirely unrelated side business deal
between the parties.
Count one, the federal question, allows defendant to remove the case to
federal court under section 1441(a). Count two clearly arises out of the same
claim, the same transaction, the same nucleus of fact, the same trial unit, so it
is not separate and independent, and section 1441(c) does not operate. The
count can, however, be removed for the very same considerations under the
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367. That is why the correct,
broad interpretation of the claim is so important.
Count three just as clearly does not arise out of the same claim, the same
transaction, the same nucleus of operative fact, the same trial unit, so it does
not qualify for supplemental jurisdiction. These factors do make it a separate
and independent claim, however, so it qualifies for removal under section
1441(c) on the strength of count one. Yet count three is beyond the
constitutional case, no matter which definition of case is adopted. That is what
makes the application of section 1441(c) unconstitutional. A part of the case
comes within the constitutional aura; anything beyond is consigned to the
nether world of unconstitutionality.
109 See discussion supra note 78.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The correct, broad definition of claim for purposes of supplemental
jurisdiction leaves no constitutional room for section 1441(c), as amended in
1990, to operate. Separate claim removal jurisdiction today can apply only to a
theory of recovery completely factually unrelated to the federal question. Such
a factually discrete theory is beyond the Osborn constitutional case, as the
limits were defined in Gibbs. Consequently, that operation is beyond the
limited authority of the federal courts granted by the Constitution.
